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MUTUAL FUND EXPENSE DISCLOSURES: A 
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 
JAMES D. COX*  
JOHN W. PAYNE** 
The last few years have not been kind to the mutual fund industry. To 
be sure, financial indices have improved with the collateral benefit of 
boosting investor optimism so that the net gain in assets under 
management by registered investment companies rose by more than ten 
percent in 2004 to reach $8.6 trillion at the end of the year.1 But the 
mutual fund scandals that were first unearthed in fall 2003, with the 
accusations of late trading involving the Canary Fund,2 have been 
compounded by further allegations of late trading involving other funds.3 
These scandals have been joined by pervasive instances of fund advisors 
looking the other way as important clients were permitted to abuse fund 
prohibitions against rapid trading.4 Even the well-established practice of 
revenue sharing, whereby brokers are rewarded by funds for 
recommending the fund to their clients,5 are being reconsidered in the 
post-Enron era in light of rising concerns over pervasive conflicts of 
interest within the financial services industry.6 For example, revenue 
 * Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The authors are grateful for the insights 
and suggestions on an early draft of this paper by the distinguished commentators at the April 2005 
conference sponsored jointly by the Washington University School of Law and Institute for Law and 
Economic Policy as well as the invaluable research assistance of Messrs. Segev Phillips and Raegan 
Watchman of the School of Law, Duke University.  
 ** Joseph J. Ruvane, Jr., Professor, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. 
 1. See INV. CO. INST., 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 3 (45th ed. 2005), 
http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/2005-factbook pdf [hereinafter 2005 FACT BOOK]. 
 2. See In re Theodore Charles Sihpol III, Securities Act Release No. 8288 (Sept. 16, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8288.htm. See also Landon Thomas, Jr., S.E.C. 
Putting Mutual Funds Under Scrutiny On Late Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at C1. 
 3. See, e.g., Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses That Harm Investors: Hearings 
Before the Financial Management, The Budget, and International Security Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) [hereinafter Hearings on Mutual Fund Abuses] 
(statement of Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission) (stating that in a recent survey more than twenty-five percent of firms admitted to late 
trading). 
 4. See, e.g., Enforcement Proceedings—SEC Files Civil Fraud Charges Against the PIMCO, 
SEC NEWS DIGEST, May 6, 2004. 
 5. See, e.g., Hearings on Mutual fund Abuses, supra note 3, at 20–23 (testimony of Mary L. 
Shapirio, NASD Vice Chairman and President Regulatory Policy and Oversight); id. at 6 (statement of 
Sen. Daniel K. Akaka, Member, S. Financial Management, The Budget, and International Security 
Subcomm.) (“revenue sharing agreements between mutual fund companies and brokers present 
conflicts of interest that must be addressed.”). 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 20–21 (testimony of Mary L. Shapiro, NASD Vice Chairman and President, 
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sharing is now regulated.7 The various mutual fund scandals have invited 
public and political focus on the rising level of fees and expenses levied 
upon funds by their advisors.8 Thus, 2004 found not only numerous 
government enforcement actions that resulted in significant financial 
settlements,9 but also a tectonic shift in the regulatory quilt that covers the 
mutual fund industry. 
Foremost among the regulatory developments for the mutual fund 
industry is the requirement of heightened transparency of how registered 
investment companies cast their proxies for their portfolio companies.10 
Greater transparency regarding how funds vote complicates the life of the 
fund manager by placing the manager between the conflicting needs of 
gaining admission as one of the acceptable vendors of 401K plans for a 
portfolio company’s employees and confronting a shareholder-friendly 
proposal (e.g., separating the position of CEO and board chair) that is 
opposed by that portfolio company’s management. The SEC also adopted 
corporate governance changes that essentially compel most funds to raise 
the number of fund directors who are independent of the fund’s advisor to 
three-fourths (from the statutorily mandated level of forty percent).11 And, 
Regulatory Policy and Oversight). 
 7. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 15C-2(C)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15C-2(C)(5) (2005). 
 8. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003, H.R. 2420, 108th Cong. 
§ 2 (2003) (proposed legislation that among other features would expand the required disclosure of 
mutual fund fees). See generally Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance 
and Other Practices that Harm Investors: Hearing before the Financial Management, The Budget, and 
International Security Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) 
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing]; Mutual Funds: Who’s Looking Out for Investors: Hearings before 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance And Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2003); Hearings on Mutual Fund Abuses, supra note 3; The Mutual 
Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003 on H.R. 2420: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Services, 108th Cong. (2003); Mutual Fund Practices and Their Effect on Individual Investors: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, And Government Sponsored Enterprises 
of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 9. See, e.g., Heather Timmons, 2 Fund Groups Agree to Pay $450 Million to End Inquiry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at C1 (detailing the settlement terms of Invesco Funds Group and an Affiliate, 
AIM Advisors); Janus Settlement Complete, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at C6 (detailing the $226.2 
million settlement by Janus Capital Group). 
 10. See SEC Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 33-8188 (Apr. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm. 
 11. See INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR FUND 
DIRECTORS: ENHANCING THE CULTURE OF INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1999) 
(recommending a variety of mechanisms to improve the independent functioning of mutual fund 
boards); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-533T, MUTUAL FUNDS: ASSESSMENT OF 
REGULATORY REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF MUTUAL FUNDS (2004) 
(discussing same). 
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as will be discussed below, in 2004 the SEC expanded the amount of 
information that funds must disclose regarding fees and other costs that are 
charged to the fund’s assets. 
The SEC’s regulatory action with respect to enhanced disclosure of 
fees and costs was the least controversial of its actions. However, if 
improved disclosure has the remedial and protective effects believed to 
follow from disclosure in capital markets, this change has the potential to 
be one of the most profound regulatory steps taken by the Commission. To 
understand why this is so, consider a recent Forbes Magazine survey 
finding that eighty-four percent of the surveyed investors believe that 
higher fund expenses result in higher performance by the fund.12 To 
students of the mutual fund industry, this statistic is a bit like saying 
higher maintenance charges are associated with better performing 
automobiles. The apparent public misperception of the impact of fund 
expenses on their return that is captured in the Forbes study is consistent 
with data showing significant inefficiencies among investors in fifty-two 
different S&P 500 index funds.13 Among this group of funds the difference 
in return (as a percentage of fund net assets) between the best and the 
worst performing funds was 2.03 percent. Although one can expect several 
management practices to explain some of the difference,14 the biggest 
 12. See Neil Weinberg, Fund Managers Know Best: As Corporations are Fessing Up to 
Investors, Mutual Funds Still Gloss Over Costs, FORBES MAG., Oct. 14, 2002, at 220.  
 CFOs have a very different perspective. See Roy Harris, Raiding the Returns, CFO MAG., May 
2004 (reporting that ninety percent of surveyed financial executives believe mutual fund fees are too 
high). Concerns regarding fees transcend their poor understanding by retail investors. The source of 
further concern is data reporting that fees charged the advisor’s captive mutual fund are twice as great 
as that the same advisors charge their pension plan and other institutional clients. See John P. Freeman 
& Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609 
(2001). Thus understanding of fees may cause their returns to be eroded by fees that are higher than if 
consumers of the funds had a better comprehension of the relative impact fees have on their 
investment return. 
 13. Cognitive deficiencies of many, if not most, individual investors are suggested by their 
failing to invest more of their money in index funds than they do. Less than eight percent of the new 
money flowing into mutual funds is directed into index funds. See John Waggoner, Investors Pour 
Money into S&P 500 Index Funds, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 1999, at B1. Statistics reflect that investors 
are better off investing in index funds. See generally JACK BOGLE, BOGLE ON MUTUAL FUNDS: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR (1994); R.E. EVANS & B.G. MALKIEL, EARN MORE 
(SLEEP BETTER): THE INDEX FUND SOLUTION (1999). The latter point is illustrated by the fact that 
eighty-four percent of actively managed mutual funds underperformed the market overall between 
1981 and 1996. See S. Burns, Vanguard Founder Decries Managed Funds Performance, HOUS. 
CHRON., Oct. 6, 1997, at 4. For a review of the many social and psychological forces that can explain 
investors’ preference for such suboptimal investment choices, see Don Moore et al., Positive Illusions 
and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 95 (1999) (hypothesizing that the common traits of over-optimism and framing 
of choices against past performance contribute significantly to investors eschewing index funds). 
 14. For example, managers may differ in the amount of cash retained for redemption, the speed 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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portion of the difference in performance is due to advisory fees and other 
costs charged to the fund.15 Not only are expenses relevant in explaining 
the relative returns investors can expect, but also future relative returns 
among the fifty-two funds are correlated with past returns so that investors 
who based their selection of an S&P 500 index fund based on which fund 
performed in the top decile in the prior year would garner 0.92% greater 
return than if they selected a firm that was in the bottom decile of the 
cohort in the prior year.16 The authors of the study explain the observed 
results being due to irrational investor behavior in selecting funds, 
reasoning that their judgment is affected by salesmanship and marketing 
of such funds. This explanation is compelling in that the funds with poorer 
performance are those with higher distribution costs.17 The study 
concludes on a discouraging note: the study’s authors describe that new 
entrants to the S&P Index fund market have costs fifty percent higher than 
their sample and that the funds falling within the bottom decile in returns 
grew at an annual rate of 20.5% compared to a growth rate of 11.8% for 
low cost funds.18 From this result we might conclude that marketing not 
only matters, but matters a lot. The authors, although recognizing that 
arbitrage can normally be expected to address inefficient price disparities 
for stocks and bonds, observe that there are no arbitrage opportunities for 
mutual fund shares, writing:  
In such a market, all that is necessary for inferior funds to exist and 
grow is a set of uninformed investors and a set of distributors who 
have an economic incentive to sell inferior products. In a market 
where arbitrage is impossible, we may be disappointed, but we 
should not be surprised when inferior products exist and even 
prosper.19 
Their findings are doubly troubling because “index funds may be 
particularly attractive to sophisticated investors who suspect that active 
of reinvesting dividends received, and may not perfectly balance their portfolios to mirror the makeup 
of the S&P 500 Index. 
 15. See Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Jeffrey A. Busse, Are Investors Rational? Choices 
among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261, 264 (2004) [hereinafter Elton et al.]. See also Paul G. Mahoney, 
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 170 (2004) (finding in a survey 
of eighty-seven Standard and Poors 500 Index Funds that after excluding section 12b-1 fees, operating 
expenses ranged from eight to eighty-five basis points).  
 16. See Elton et al., supra note 15, at 273. 
 17. Id. at 285. 
 18. Id. at 286. 
 19. Id. at 286. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/2
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management does not add value.”20 Thus, as we move from index funds to 
funds with more active management we are likely not only to find higher 
operating costs but also to find even less sensitivity to operating costs on 
the part of investors. 
On an even broader level, a study of funds between 1970 and 1999 
(during which the studied number of funds rose from 465 to 3,533) found 
that load fees declined whereas operating fees increased significantly.21 
Even more importantly, the study’s authors observed a negative 
relationship between flows of money into funds and the presence and level 
of load fees. On the other hand, they detected no relationship between fund 
flows and operating expenses.22 From this observation they surmise that 
investors had grown sensitive to point-of-sale charges such as load fees, 
but are apparently oblivious to on-going operating expenses. Moreover, 
over time fund managers have responded to investors’ sensitivities and 
insensitivities by shifting their revenue source to the less noticed operating 
expenses.23 
While it is not conceivable that meaningful arbitrage can be introduced 
efficiently in the pricing of mutual fund shares when the fund is, as is the 
custom, an open-end fund, we might understand the disquieting 
inefficiencies captured in the above study as due to another problem, 
namely the incompleteness of information disclosed to investors. That is, 
we should question not only whether investors are provided with ample 
information but whether the information they receive is in a context that 
makes it processible by them so that their choices among competing funds 
appears more rational. In 2004, the SEC improved the disclosure of fees 
and costs that mutual funds must make.24 This paper examines the efficacy 
of the recently adopted disclosure requirements for mutual fund expenses 
through the lens of social and psychological insights. Although the 
principal focus is the impact of disclosure on fund holders or individuals 
considering investing in funds, we also consider whether properly 
designed disclosures can provide an important subsidiary function of 
enhancing the fund’s independent directors’ monitoring of the advisor’s 
stewardship of the fund.25  
 20. See Paul Mahoney, supra note 15, at 171. 
 21. See Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of 
Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows (2002), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/odean/papers/MutualFunds/ 
Out%20of%/20Sight%20031202.pdf (working paper) (forthcoming J. Bus.). 
 22. Id. at 11–14. 
 23. Id. at 19–20. 
 24. See discussion in text accompanying notes 97–99. 
 25. One can understand the mutual fund governance issue vis-à-vis compensation in the larger 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The organization of our article is straightforward. Part I reviews the 
mutual fund industry over time with particular emphasis on the rapid 
growth—both absolute and relative to fund assets—of expenses over the 
industry’s short history. In Part II we review the many reasons why 
discipline for mutual fund fees26 cannot be expected to flow from litigation 
that challenges the fees as either being excessive or even the product of 
self interest. The importance of governance and disclosure as a regulator 
of mutual fund fees, as contrasted with litigation, is examined in Part III. 
The newly developed disclosure requirements and heightened governance 
requirements are also described in Part III. In Part IV, we provide an 
overview of the insights provided by the judgment and decision-making 
research bearing upon how individuals, be they consumers or investors, 
make decisions. Finally, we conclude in Part V by evaluating how well the 
recent SEC disclosure requirements comport with the insights from the 
cognitive sciences. We also provide our own suggestions for enhancing 
investor choice through a reformulated disclosure format and speculate on 
how our suggested disclosure requirements are likely to complement the 
SEC’s initiative in strengthening the oversight by the fund’s independent 
directors. 
tapestry of executive compensation. Talented managers come with hefty compensation packages. But 
in America, we need not be so qualified; it is accurate to say that American business executives are 
expensive regardless of whether the particular executive has talent or not. Between 1982 and 1997, 
total compensation of executives of public companies rose 269.7%, or 11.5% annually. See Randall S. 
Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 454–55 (2002). Only major 
league baseball and NBA players experienced faster compensation increases than those in the 
executive suites of American corporations. The large pay packages were not just lavished on the 
excellent. A separate public concern is observed for substantial severance packages awarded to 
unsuccessful managers. For the past two decades, the rising tide of executive compensation lifted the 
pay of the entire executive flotilla and prompted a national debate over the phenomenon. The antidote 
for the public concern for executive compensation has been SEC regulations calling for greater 
transparency in how executive pay is established and the exchanges stiffening their governance 
requirements by requiring independent compensation committees for listed companies. By all 
accounts, neither has had much effect. Indeed, there is some cause to believe that the heightened 
disclosures have had the unintended consequence of stimulating further increases in executive pay 
rather than retarding the upward spiral. Thus, we question whether disclosure or governance in the 
mutual fund area will have any greater impact than it has outside the mutual fund area in retarding the 
rise of executive compensation. 
 26. The fees and expenses referred to in this article are those customarily known as a fund’s 
operating expenses which are made up of the management fee (this is the amount the adviser charges 
to manage the fund) as well as other operating expenses incurred by the fund, e.g., accounting, 
custodial, and mailing expenses. The operating expenses also include 12b-1 fees which are distribution 
expenses that are paid from the fund. There are other expenses that are not included among operating 
expenses, such as brokerage costs. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-551T, MUTUAL 
FUNDS INFORMATION ON TRENDS IN FEES AND THEIR RELATED DISCLOSURE 1 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/2
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I. BIGGER AND BIGGER: THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY OVER TIME 
At the close of 2004, there were 8,044 mutual funds—broadly divided 
among equity, bond/hybrid, and money market funds—with a total of 
$8.107 trillion in assets.27 The 4,550 equity funds28 are the largest sector of 
the fund industry, with $4.384 trillion in assets.29 Thanks primarily to the 
bull market of the 1990s and the growing importance of 401K retirement 
plans, more than two-thirds of the increase in funds since 1990 has been in 
equity funds.30 There appear to be no substantial barriers to entry to the 
mutual fund industry, even though there are several well-recognized fund 
complexes. For example, eighty-one percent of all equity and hybrid funds 
and sixty percent of all bond funds were formed after 1991.31 The new 
entrants neither removed nor conferred market share to the large fund 
complexes. The five largest fund complexes’ market share (in terms of 
assets under management) was thirty-seven percent in 1990 and increased 
slightly to thirty-nine percent by 2004; similar stability is reflected during 
the same time period among the twenty-five largest fund complexes whose 
market share in 1990 was seventy-six percent and was seventy-four 
percent in 2004.32  
Although nearly one-half of all household investments in mutual funds 
occur through their retirement plans, a healthy thirty-seven percent are 
sold through financial professionals, most commonly a stock broker.33 
Purchases through a broker frequently involve other assistance by the 
broker that can be seen as part of the implicit cost of the transaction so that 
some revenue sharing between the fund and the broker can be expected.34 
 27. 2005 FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 9, 122.  
 28. Id. at 63 tbl.5. 
 29. Id. at 61 tbl.3. 
 30. Id. at 63 tbl.5 (of the 4,965 additional funds since 1990, 3,451 (69.5%) have been equity 
funds). This pace was slowed, of course, in 2000–2002 with the arrival of the bear market. INV. CO. 
INST., 2004 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 40 (44th ed. 2004), http://www.ici.org/statements/res/2004-
factbook.pdf [hereinafter 2004 FACT BOOK]. 
 31. Id. at 41. One impact of so many new entrants is their probable impact on increasing the 
overall fund expense ratio. See SEC DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT: REPORT ON MUTUAL 
FUND FEES AND EXPENSES 24 tbl.10 (2000) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] (reporting that 3,873 funds with 
an existence of less than six years had an average expense ratio of 1.23% whereas those in existence 
more than ten years had an expense ratio of 0.80%). The size of the fund also impacts the expense ratio 
so that relatively smaller funds (those with assets of $51 million to $200 million) have an expense ratio 
over forty percent greater than the expense ratio for funds with assets exceeding $1 billion. Id. at 25 
tbl.11. 
 32. 2005 FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 8. 
 33. 2004 FACT BOOK, supra note 30, at 45. 
 34. The Investment Company Institute describes such services as: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The sum flowing into funds is staggering: net inflows to long-term (equity, 
bond, and hybrid) funds was $210 billion in 2004.35 Assuming a fair 
amount of investor discretion prevails in most of the transactions 
underlying flows of cash into long-term funds, the magnitude of this sum 
underscores how important it is for investors to be armed with sufficient 
information in an understandable format so that they can be in a position 
to make wise choices. Stated differently, would we feel comfortable if 
consumers spent $210 billion annually in purchasing automobiles without 
knowledge of their relative fuel efficiency?  
From a different perspective, 19.5% of household assets in 2004 were 
invested in mutual funds;36 the stewardship of their individual nest egg is 
dependent upon their holders being informed about the performance and 
the related costs of their investments. Seventy-seven percent of these 
decisions are made by households (either as to mutual funds held in a 
retail account, employer-sponsored pension plan, individual retirement 
account, or variable annuity) and only twelve percent are by fiduciaries.37  
In his recent testimony before Congress, industry critic Jack Bogle 
recounted how fees have grown rapidly during the relatively short life of 
the mutual fund industry. In 1965, the total asset value of equity funds was 
$26.3 billion; by 2003 the number had grown 128-fold to $3.36 trillion.38 
During this same period, fund expense ratios increased from 0.87% for the 
average equity fund to 1.62%, an 86% increase.39 In absolute dollar 
As an intermediary between investors and funds, financial professionals also conduct 
transactions for the shareholder, maintain the financial records for the investments under their 
management, send periodic financial statements to shareholders, and coordinate the 
distribution of prospectuses, financial reports, and proxy statements to shareholders on behalf 
of the funds. 
Id. at 47. 
 35. 2005 FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 5. 
 36. Id. at 12. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 8, at 25 (testimony of John C. Bogle, Founder and Former 
Executive of the Vanguard Group, President of the Bogle Financial Markets Research Center). Many 
of the observations in Mr. Bogle’s testimony are embodied as well in John C. Bogle, Re-Mutualizing 
the Mutual Fund Industry—The Alpha and the Omega, 45 B.C. L. REV. 391 (2004) (arguing that 
today’s prevalent practice of external advisors for funds is inconsistent with the Investment Company 
Act of 1940). 
 39. Oversight Hearings, supra note 8, at 125. The cited figures are unweighted expense ratios; if 
the average is weighted by each fund’s assets the 1965 average expense ratio is 0.51% and that in 2003 
is 0.95%, still reflecting an 86% increase. Id. If we believe Mr. Bogle’s cup is half empty, then 
industry consultant Lipper Inc.’s cup is half full in reporting that between 1992 and 2003 the total 
expense ratio edged up slightly from 0.773% to 0.786%. See id. at 193 (statement of Mr. Jeffrey C. 
Keil, Vice-President Global Fiduciary Review, Lipper Inc.). This would appear to conflict with the 
data assembled by Mr. Bogle. However, the Lipper data, in addition to capturing a much shorter and 
recent time period, also appears to report on all actively-managed open-end funds, so that it includes 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/2
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amounts, total fees charged to equity funds grew from $134 million to 
$31.9 billion between 1965 and 2003, a 238-fold increase (nearly twice the 
increase in the absolute 128-fold increase in equity fund assets).40 Mr. 
Bogle attributes the rapid rate of growth in fees to the demutualization of 
mutual funds, a process that has transformed nearly all mutual funds to 
portfolios that are managed externally rather than by a permanent staff that 
is in the employ of the fund.41 So viewed, it is a massive and pervasive 
misnomer to refer to the industry as the mutual fund industry.  
The industry trade group, the Investment Company Institute, counters 
charges by Mr. Bogle by its own study showing that total investor costs 
had declined in recent years.42 However, about half of the reported decline 
was attributable to investors changing their consumption patterns by 
placing more of their investments in no-load funds. And, even the ICI 
study still reported that the average expense ratio (i.e., the portion of the 
fund spent as operating and sales costs) for stock funds rose from 0.77% in 
1980 to 0.88% in 2001.43 Even more recent data reflects the positive 
effects of increasing competition among funds. Lipper Inc. reported that 
844 funds reduced their fees in 2004, more than double the number 
reported in 2002 and 2003 combined.44 The trade group provides further 
reassurance by reporting that in 2003 two-thirds of net new cash invested 
in equity funds flowed into funds with an expense ratio under one percent 
and that fifty-seven percent of assets in equity funds were subject to 
expense ratios below one percent.45 This response may not provide as 
much solace as we would like. The number reducing their fees in 2004 is 
only about ten percent of all funds. Moreover, it does not address the 
questions of whether fees are still relatively high even among those funds 
that have recently reduced their fees. We are all aware that, with the 
wonders of compounding interest, annual differences of twenty or thirty 
basis points can over twenty years translate into significant sums of 
bond funds and blended funds. In fact, when not weighted by asset amounts, the Lipper data reflects a 
median increase from 0.897% in 1992 to 1.297% in 2003. Id. The Lipper data therefore parallels the 
SEC’s own study of all stock and bond funds that found their combined average expense ratio 
increased from 0.73% in 1979 to 0.94% in 1999, primarily due to greater use of 12b-1 fees to pay for 
fund distribution costs. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 20. 
 40. Oversight Hearing, supra note 8, at 125. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See FUNDAMENTALS, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE RESEARCH IN BRIEF, TOTAL 
SHAREHOLDER COST OF MUTUAL FUNDS, vol. 13, no. 5, 1 (Dec. 2004), http://www.ici.org/statements/ 
res/fm-v13n5.pdf. 
 43. Id. at 3 fig.2. 
 44. See Tom Lauricella, Fund Fees Are Falling, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2005, at R1 (reporting also 
that 135 funds raised their fees in 2004, whereas 417 raised their fees in 2003). 
 45. 2004 FACT BOOK, supra note 30, at 67. 
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money. And, for the fund managers, twenty basis points when applied to a 
billion dollar fund will equal two million dollars in additional income 
annually to the fund’s advisor. As a distinguished senator was reported to 
have said regarding the national budget, “a billion here, a billion there, and 
pretty soon you’re talking about some real money.”46 
II. WHY NOT SUE THEM?47 
The rise in mutual fund fees has occurred without serious legal 
challenges to their being excessive. An understanding of why this situation 
is so begins with a full appreciation of the ineffectiveness of the legal 
system to redress complaints of excessive and wasteful compensation. The 
impotence of the American legal system to regulate executive 
compensation is well understood. Those bringing such complaints, 
whether against corporate executives or the advisors to mutual funds, face 
serious substantive and procedural hurdles. Indeed, we might conclude 
that courts have not only failed to be a restraining force on compensation, 
but also have, in their wayward tact, contributed mightily to the insularity 
of the compensation-setting process. 
A review of the history of the courts’ interface with executive 
compensation reveals that excessive executive compensation has long 
been a part of the public debate. In the wake of the Great Depression, there 
were many judicial attacks on executive compensation, especially bonus 
and incentive compensation arrangements. The focus of these suits and 
compensation-related abuses were captured in extensive congressional 
hearings leading up the enactment of the federal securities laws.48 The 
most famous of the suits was prompted by the bonus awarded the 
executives and directors of the American Tobacco Company.49 The 
president of American Tobacco, who in addition to receiving a salary in 
excess of one million dollars, was granted the option to purchase shares 
 46. This statement is most often attributed to Senator Everett Dirksen, see BARTLETT’S 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 745 (17th ed. 2002), although his congressional center cannot find any proof 
he ever made the statement. See The Dirksen Center, http://www.dirksencenter.org/printemdbillion 
here.htm (last visited May 24, 2005). 
 47. A portion of this section was adapted from JAMES D. COX, FAIR PAY FOR CEOS: 
MAXIMIZING FIRM VALUE BY MINIMIZING INCOME DISPARITY IN LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA: 
TRENDS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR (N.Y.U. Press 2006) (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones 
eds.). 
 48. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX AND HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 11.05, at 
567–68 (2d ed. 2003) (reporting on suits against industry giants such as Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 
General Motors, and National Cash Register). 
 49. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933). 
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immediately for an amount $1,169,000 below there current market value. 
The approving directors as part of the same option arrangement, also 
awarded themselves handsome options. The case ended triumphantly for 
the plaintiff in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court concluded that even 
though the arrangement had been approved by the stockholders and was 
therefore “supported by the presumption of regularity,” that presumption 
nevertheless would not  
justify payments of sums as salaries so large as in substance and 
effect to amount to spoilation or waste of corporate property. . . . If 
a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which it 
is given, it is in reality a gift in part and the majority stockholders 
have no power to give away corporate property against the protest 
of the minority. . . . The facts alleged by the plaintiff are sufficient 
to require that the district court, upon a consideration of all the 
relevant facts brought forward by the parties, determine whether 
and to what extent payments to the individual defendants under the 
by-laws constitute misuse and waste of the money of the 
corporation.50 
The substantive reasonableness focus embodied in the American 
Tobacco case has since been replaced by an emphasis on process. The 
result of the shift from substance to process is that suits against executive 
compensation have their highest chance for success in close corporations 
and much less in public corporations. This fact is because process is more 
likely overlooked in close corporations whereas process is most always 
present in public corporations due to their ability to retain talented and 
compulsive counsel. Consider that, in their study of all litigated 
compensation disputes between 1912 and 2000, Professors Thomas and 
Martin report that plaintiffs’ success rate is about fifty percent greater 
within the close corporation context than in suits arising within the public 
corporation when the complaint is substantively-based, not process-based 
and twice as high when the complaint focuses on process.51  
The greatest barrier the plaintiff faces in litigating executive 
compensation claims is satisfying the “demand requirement.”52 A suit 
 50. Id. at 591–92 (quoting in part Judge Swan’s dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit’s 
decision dismissing the suit, 60 F.2d 109, 113–14 (2d Cir. 1932)).  
 51. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges To Executive Pay: An 
Exercise In Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 608, 610 (2001). 
 52. The demand requirement applies with equal vigor to derivative suits under the Investment 
Company Act alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, but, as discussed later, does not apply to suits 
premised upon Section 36(b) for excessive fees. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 
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challenging executive compensation is a derivative suit so that in most 
states a precondition to bringing the suit is the necessity of the plaintiff 
proving that the board of directors is incapacitated by self interest or that 
the conduct that is the substance of the derivative is facially harmful to the 
corporation. A leading Delaware case, Aronson v. Lewis,53 reflects how 
high a hurdle the demand requirement places in the path of the derivative 
suit plaintiff when the focus is executive compensation.54 Aronson 
involved a challenge to the employment contract awarded to Leo Fink, the 
owner of forty-seven percent of the voting stock of Meyers Parking 
System, Inc. When Fink was seventy-five years old, the firm granted him 
an employment contract that would pay him $150,000 a year (plus five 
percent of the firm’s pre-tax profits above $2.4 million). Fink could 
terminate the contract at any time and would receive a six-figure 
consulting payment for the remainder of his life; the payments would be 
made even if he became incapacitated. The board also approved interest-
free loans to Fink that totaled $225,000. The court announced that the suit 
could only proceed without the approval by Fink’s hand-picked board if 
the plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts that created “reasonable doubt” 
regarding either the board’s independence or the compensation 
arrangement’s excessiveness.55 The Delaware Supreme Court held that 
these facts failed to raise a reasonable doubt that the directors were 
independent or that their decision lacked a rational basis and, therefore, 
dismissed the action.56 Neither the dominant stockholdings of Fink nor the 
facially one-sided employment and loan agreements were sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the compensation package was 
reasonable or that it was the product of an independent judgment by the 
(1984). With respect to derivative suits under the Investment Company Act for which the demand 
requirement applies, the Supreme Court in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 
108–09 (1991) held that the federal court in such a challenge should apply the law of the state of 
incorporation to determine if a demand is required on the board of directors to initiate a derivative suit 
on behalf of the mutual fund. The deference to state law in this matter reflects the substantive nature of 
the demand requirement. As the Kamen court reasoned, “the function of the demand doctrine in 
delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate 
litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance’, not ‘procedure.’” Id. at 96–97. The Supreme Court earlier 
held that the power of a board of directors to establish a special litigation committee to evaluate the 
corporation’s interest in a derivative suit’s continuance and the effect, if any, to be accorded the 
committee’s recommendation, was to be determined by the law of the corporation’s domicile. See 
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478–82 (1979). 
 53. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).  
 54. See generally Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (clarifying that appellate review is 
de novo but that discretion will still be accorded to the board of directors). 
 55. Aronson, 473 A.201 at 814. 
 56. Id. at 815–18. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/2
p 907 Cox-Payne book pages.doc 4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] MUTUAL FUND EXPENSE DISCLOSURES 919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
directors approving the compensation.57 Post-Aronson decisions support 
the view that Aronson was not a mere aberration.58 One observable impact 
of Aronson is the greater prominence that the demand requirement plays in 
Delaware post-Aronson. Prior to Aronson, defendants made motions to 
dismiss the derivative suit challenging executive compensation for failure 
to make a demand on the board in roughly the same percentage of cases in 
Delaware (fourteen percent) as outside of Delaware (eighteen percent); 
after Aronson, such motions in executive compensation decisions are 
made in seventy-five percent of the Delaware cases compared with only 
fourteen percent for non-Delaware cases.59 
We might view the recent Delaware decision, In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litigation,60 as an important first step toward closer judicial 
scrutiny of executive compensation decisions. The case arose from the 
Disney board’s approval of an executive compensation contract with 
Michael Ovitz and implicit approval of a non-fault termination of Ovitz 
that resulted in his receiving in excess of $140 million after barely one 
year of employment. The Chancery Court held, based on the egregious 
facts set forth in the complaint, that the plaintiff’s complaint withstood the 
 57. Lewis was allowed to amend his complaint which, as amended, withstood the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss. See Lewis v. Aronson, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 243 (1985). However, even this 
subsequent opinion held that demand was not excused by allegations that Fink controlled a majority of 
the shares, that the board nominees were his nominees, or that a majority of the directors served in 
subservient officer positions that could be terminated as a result of Fink’s financial interests in various 
firms. Id. at 247–53. What permitted the complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss was the allegation 
that the compensation arrangement was a means of addressing Fink’s concern that, in a multifaceted 
stock sale and purchase arrangement involving companies in which seven of the firm’s directors were 
themselves officers or directors, Fink had received too low a price for the shares he sold. Id. at 250–53. 
Thus, the complaint alleged the consulting contract with Fink was a ruse, being merely a means to use 
the assets of Meyers to compensate Fink for his sale of shares to companies in which seven of the 
Meyers’ directors were officers or directors. Id. So alleged, the court believed that a demand on the 
board could be excused since a majority of the Meyers directors were interested in the outcome of the 
suit. Id. The court also believed reasonable doubt was raised in the amended complaint as to whether 
the contract with Fink was the product of a reasonable business judgment. Id. at 253. The amended 
complaint alleged that Fink lived in Florida but Meyers’ operations were in New York and states other 
than Florida. Id. at 252. Moreover, the amended complaint also alleged that through a contract Meyers 
had with a second corporation and that corporation’s contract with Fink, he was already bound to 
provide managerial services to Meyers. Id. at 252–53. The court said this additional fact raised a 
reasonable doubt whether the services Fink would provide are so grossly inadequate that no sound 
business judgment would deem it worth what Meyers was called upon to pay for those services. Id. at 
253. 
 58. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 206 (Del. 1991) (requiring demand because at least 
twelve of the twenty-one directors of General Motors were believed to be independent). One cause to 
believe Aronson might be an aberration is that its plaintiff, Harry Lewis, is a professional plaintiff. See 
Richard B. Schmitt, Attorneys Are Often Big Winners When Shareholders Sue Companies, WALL ST. 
J., June 12, 1986, at 31 (reporting that Lewis has filed dozens of suits in Delaware).  
 59. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 51, at 579. 
 60. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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defendant’s motion to dismiss.61 Among the facts alleged were the 
following: Ovitz was hired pursuant to pressure from Disney’s CEO, 
Michael Eisner; Eisner and Ovitz had been close friends for twenty-five 
years; Ovitz had never been an executive for a publicly-owned 
entertainment company; internal documents warned that Ovitz was 
unqualified; a member of the compensation committee received a 
$250,000 fee for securing Ovitz’s employment with Disney; neither the 
compensation committee nor the board received (and hence had no 
opportunity to review) either the draft or final employment contract with 
Ovitz; the compensation committee and the board devoted hardly any time 
at their meetings to reviewing and approving the employment of Ovitz; the 
compensation committee and the board delegated to Eisner the details of 
the employment contract and did not condition its becoming effective 
upon their final review or approval; the final version of the employment 
contract varied significantly from the drafts earlier summarized for the 
compensation committee;62 from the outset of his employment Ovitz 
performed poorly; no experts were consulted at any time in either the 
employment or termination of Ovitz; the terms for Orvitz’ departure were 
entered into without express committee or board approval; and the 
severance agreement entered into by Eisner (acting for Disney) and Ovitz 
awarded significant financial benefits to Ovitz more quickly than had he 
remained with Disney.  
The Chancellor therefore concluded: 
These facts, if true, do more than portray directors who, in a 
negligent or grossly negligent manner, merely failed to inform 
themselves or to deliberate adequately about an issue of material 
importance to their corporation. Instead, the facts . . . suggest that 
the defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded 
their responsibilities, adopting a “we don’t care about the risks” 
attitude concerning a material corporate decision. Knowing or 
deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty to act 
faithfully and with appropriate care is conduct, in my opinion, that 
may not have been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the 
best interests of the company. Put differently, all of the alleged 
facts, if true, imply that the defendant directors knew that they were 
 61. Id. 
 62. For example, the drafts summarized for the compensation committee provided that Ovitz 
could invoke the non-fault termination clause (which resulted in substantial financial awards) if he was 
wrongfully terminated, died or became disabled. The final version allowed any departure to trigger the 
clause unless he was terminated for gross negligence or malfeasance. Id. at 284. 
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making material decisions without adequate information and 
without adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if 
the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer 
injury or loss. Viewed in this light . . . [the] complaint sufficiently 
alleges a breach of the directors’ obligation to act honestly and in 
good faith in the corporation’s best interests for a Court to conclude, 
if the facts are true, that the defendant directors’ conduct fell outside 
the protection of the business judgment rule.63 
The facts alleged in Disney reflect nothing less than an abdication of 
the board’s monitoring role, not simply sloppy procedures. But alleging 
facts and proving them are very different undertakings and, hence, 
frequently lead to very different outcomes. Chancellor Chandler concluded 
after a trial that, although many of the participants in the Ovitz odyssey no 
doubt acted negligently, none were found to have acted either grossly 
negligently or in bad faith.64 Thus, assuming no reversal on the appeal 
pending when this article was before the printer, the conclusion to be 
drawn from Disney is that there is little, if any, reason to expect the 
judiciary to be an effective and devoted governor on executive 
compensation. 
Moreover, it is to be expected that in most instances the flagrantly 
dominating CEO, perhaps supplemented by cronyism, as it appears to 
have been in Disney, will not be present. Instead, the record will be 
painfully constructed to support a result that may not be far from the 
windfall garnered by Ovitz. It is in this context that the next significant 
development must occur, if there is to be further judicial development to 
address what by all accounts is a breakdown in board control of executive 
compensation. Simply put, it appears that the facts alleged in Disney 
served up a nice softball for the Chancery Court to knock beyond the 
park’s typical walls. It remains to be seen whether that court or any other 
court can make contact with the curve balls that are more frequently 
pitched. 
 63. Id. at 289. 
 64. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 205 Del. Ch. Lexis 113 (2005). Of special note 
is the Chancellor’s suggestion that “bad faith” involving a conscious disregard of oversight arises only 
when the board has a separate duty to act, such as when state law conditions a merger upon their being 
approval by the board of directors. Id. at 175. However, this point is not emphasized in the opinion’s 
treatment of the outside directors. For example, Chancellor Chandler concludes that the board was not 
required by statue to involve itself in hiring Ovitz, id. at 213, and proceeds to conclude that directors 
Poitier and Lozano did not disregard their duty to act. Id. at 224. Similar conclusions were reached 
with respect to the directors’ non-action with respect to Ovitz’s termination. Id. at 236–38. 
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Thus, the judiciary initially insulates pay challenges from meaningful 
attack through shareholder suit by unquestioning obeisance to the demand 
requirement. Even in the rare case where demand is excused, the courts’ 
focus typically is on process, not substance, so that only in the truly 
extreme (devoid of the contrivances introduced by lawyers and other 
consultants to the board) situation such as Disney will the compensation 
decision be subject to review. With such a narrow focus on process, the 
directors who approve compensation defer to their advisors, be they the 
counsel or compensation consultants, who assure that the rights steps for 
orderly deliberations occur. Lost in this process is a perspective of what is 
the right compensation level. 
The approach and the record for challenges of mutual fund advisory 
fees is procedurally easier than the process for questioning executive 
compensation generally. Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 provides that “the investment adviser of a registered investment 
company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the 
receipt of compensation for services” paid for by the fund.65 In Daily 
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox66 the Supreme Court held that, although the 
cause of action created by section 36(b) is procedurally a derivative suit, 
there is no demand requirement the suit’s plaintiff must satisfy.67 Despite 
removing this obstacle from the suit’s path, serious substantive hurdles 
must still be overcome by those challenging the fund’s fee because the 
highly deferential approach that emphasizes procedural rather than 
substantive factors that so dominates the demand requirement in corporate 
derivative suits has a parallel in the court’s approach to interpreting 
section 36(b)’s fiduciary duty standard.68 
Section 36(b) was added to the Act in 197069 in response to proposals 
by the SEC that the Act should be amended to establish a standard of 
“reasonableness” to apply to fund fees.70 Just what Congress believed to 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2004). 
 66. 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (interpreting the language and legislative history of Section 36(b) of the 
Investment Company Act). 
 67. Id. 
 68. For an excellent analysis of the problems of courts according deference to the fund directors 
in the demand requirement and otherwise in suits under the general fiduciary requirements of section 
36(a) of the Investment Company Act, see Donald Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary 
Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor 
Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017 (2005) (critically examining the courts’ deference to state law 
regarding the demand requirement and their belief that fund directors will reflect a “consumerist” 
perspective to suit’s challenging fund fees).  
 69. See Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 
(1970). 
 70. See generally Robert N. Cowen, Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees and the New Standard of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/2
p 907 Cox-Payne book pages.doc 4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] MUTUAL FUND EXPENSE DISCLOSURES 923 
 
 
 
 
 
 
be the difference between its call for the advisor to have a fiduciary duty 
with respect to setting its fees as opposed to the fees meeting presumably 
an objective reasonableness standard is not reflected in the committee 
reports accompanying the amendment.71 What is known is that the 
advisors collectively opposed the SEC’s standard and that plaintiffs are 
still seeking to achieve their first victory under section 36(b). Despite the 
relative procedural ease of initiating suits under section 36(b), there has 
not been a single adjudication of excessive fees since its enactment. 
The bewilderment72 with the lack of success under section 36(b) in 
challenging fees arises from industry-wide developments—such as rapid 
growth in the size of funds with fees appearing not to reflect there being 
economies of scale—that parallel the facts of the leading case challenging 
advisor fees under this provision. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
Management, Inc.73 challenged the advisor fees for a money market fund 
whose assets under management had grown in four years from $428 
million to over $19 billion,74 during which time the management fees 
jumped from $1.6 million to $39 million.75 The advisor fees were based on 
a percentage of the average annual daily value of the fund’s net assets, 
being 0.5% of assets below $500 million, declining by various 
intermediate percentages, and with a rate of 0.275% for assets greater than 
$2.5 billion.76 The major argument of the plaintiff was that substantial 
economies of scale77 were present even after the fund eclipsed the $2.5 
billion level so that further reductions in the rate were in order.78 
Gartenberg held that in deciding whether the fees violate the fiduciary 
duty standard of section 36(b) requires the court to inquire whether the 
total fee is “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable 
relationship to the services rendered.”79 This standard becomes difficult to 
Fiduciary Duty—Interpreting the 1970 Mutual Fund Act, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 638–50 (1971) 
(contrasting the criteria the SEC proposed should be used under its “reasonableness” standard with the 
less intrusive criteria of section 36(b)’s fiduciary duty standard). 
 71. See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1969, S. REP. No. 91-184 (1969); Investment 
Company Amendments of 1970, H.R. REP. No. 91-1382 (1970). 
 72. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, supra note 12 (reviewing the history of section 
36(b) and criticizing Gartenberg and its progeny). 
 73. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 74. Id. at 930. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 926. 
 77. For evidence that economies of scale do exist within the mutual fund industry, see David A. 
Latzko, Economies of Scale in Mutual Fund Administration, 22 J. FIN. RES. 331 (1999) (finding the 
average cost curve of the all types of mutual fund is downward sloping). 
 78. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 926. 
 79. Id. at 928. 
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apply with any precision because, as the court recognizes, the incestuous 
relationships that are so common within the mutual fund industry require 
evaluating a wide range of services the fund obtains from the adviser as a 
part of the advisory fees. 
[B]ecause of the potentially incestuous relationships between many 
advisers and their funds, other factors may be more important in 
determining whether a fee is so excessive as to constitute a “breach 
of fiduciary duty.” These include the adviser-manager’s cost in 
providing the service, the nature and quality of the service, the 
extent to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as 
the fund grows larger, and the volume of orders which must be 
processed by the manager.80 
The plaintiff’s burden of persuasion on these considerations is 
enormous. For example, Merrill Lynch in Gartenberg produced three 
studies bearing on the relative profitability of the fund managed by it with 
profits to itself ranging from $15 million to a loss of nearly $7.8 million; 
the differences among the studies are explained by the differing cost 
allocation assumptions used in each report.81 Other unsuccessful assaults 
on advisory fees have also fallen prey to the difficult revenue and expense 
allocation problems faced by the plaintiff.82 In other legal arenas, the 
fairness of a transaction, and particularly in searching for evidence of 
overreaching, is suggested by comparison to the practices elsewhere.83 
Under this approach, the reasonableness of a fund’s advisory fees would 
be assessed against those charged by others in the industry. However, 
Gartenberg dismissed the relevance of such comparisons, reasoning that 
funds, or at least money market funds such as those before it, although 
 80. Id. at 929–30. 
 81. Id. at 931 n.4. The plaintiff was similarly unsuccessful in challenging the fees the same 
advisor charged for 1982 in the face of the advisor’s expert testimony that it had suffered a net loss of 
some $5.7 million in 1982. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 740 F.2d 190, 193 (2d 
Cir. 1984). 
 82. See, e.g., Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472, 493–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(plaintiff’s expert testified that manager earned profits of $47.5 million, defendant’s expert testified the 
adviser suffered a $77 million loss, and the court essentially split the difference between the widely 
varying estimates to dismiss the suit); Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 
962, 973–74 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 835 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987) (faulting plaintiff’s expert for 
failing to match services provided to various types of clients with the fees charged those clients). 
 83. See, e.g., Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Ctr., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) 
(in assessing whether burden of proof met in self dealing contract the court compared the appraised 
value of property with the yearly rental called for under the lease); Johnson v. Witkowski, 573 N.E.2d 
513, 521–22 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (fairness of a self dealing lease determined by reference to 
comparable leases arising in arms length dealings). 
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competing for investors’ funds do not do so on their relative fees.84 Thus, 
in Kalish v. Franklin Advisors, Inc.,85 the court rejected evidence that 
Vanguard’s low-cost GNMA fund was relevant in assessing the much 
higher advisory fees charged by Franklin Advisors for their own GNMA 
fund. Interestingly, the Gartenberg court suggests that the fund’s 
independent directors could, in the interest of the fund’s holders, initiate 
their own studies of fund costs and advisor profits.86 
Thus, much like the experiences within corporate law, litigation under 
section 36(b) has not been a noticeable force in restraining advisor fees for 
mutual funds. The standard announced in Gartenberg and followed by 
other courts requires the plaintiff to prove that the fees are 
disproportionate, and therefore mandates evidence that is riddled with 
assumptions and estimates over which reasonable differences exist 
between the perspectives of the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, if a 
regulatory governor for advisory fees is to be found, it is likely to be 
through the traditional approach of the securities laws: enhanced 
disclosure. 
III. REGULATORY INITIATIVES  
Mutual fund fees and expenses fall within two broad categories. The 
more transparent category is transactional fees which are the sales loads 
and redemption fees. These are readily observable because the investor 
learns no later than after receiving his confirmation that less than all the 
sums paid are actually invested in the fund or, in the case of redemption 
fees, he is receiving less than the net asset value of the shares upon 
redemption. The real issue with fee disclosures are those falling within the 
on-going category that includes management fees and so-called 12b-1 
fees, which are fees charged to the fund’s assets to pay for certain 
permissible marketing and distribution activities.87 
 84. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929. 
 85. 742 F. Supp. 1222, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 86. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 933. 
 87. The authority for such fees is in Investment Company Act Rule 12b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 
(2004). For a sweeping review of 12b-1 fees, see LORI WALSH, SEC STAFF REPORT, THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS TO FUND SHAREHOLDERS OF 12B-1 PLANS: AN EXAMINATION OF FUND FLOWS, EXPENSES 
AND RETURNS (2004) (advisors not fund owners benefit from 12b-1 fees), http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf. For evidence that 12b-1 is just one of several methods advisors 
employ to shift fund costs to fund owners, see Nicolai Siggelkow, Expense Shifting: An Empirical 
Study of Agency Costs in the Mutual Fund Industry 1 (Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., working paper, 
1999) (allocating brokerage in exchange for research and other services, commonly known as “soft 
dollars,” shifts significant operating expenses to fund owners). However, 12b-1 fees no doubt 
supported movement away from load fees. See Sean Collins, The Effect of 12b-1 Plans on Mutual 
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The SEC’s various regulatory initiatives over the years with respect to 
fees are driven by several considerations, each linked to investor 
ignorance. First, fees are an important variable in explaining the returns an 
investor can expect by purchasing a mutual fund.88 For example, one 
percent is the maximum level of distribution costs that Rule 12b-1 permits 
to be levied against the fund’s assets by its advisor.89 Therefore, if a fund 
that earned a net return of eight percent with a one percent expense ratio 
for twenty years had instead tacked on an additional one percent in 12b-1 
fees (or for that matter imposed an additional one percent in its 
management fees) it would reduce the overall account balance by more 
than eighteen percent at the end of that twenty-year period, i.e., nearly 
one-fifth the value of the account.90 A second force underlying the SEC’s 
concern is that investors do not understand the source of fund fees and 
costs and, more importantly, how these costs adversely impact expected 
returns.91 Thus, to the extent that information regarding fees has been 
disclosed, it was not having the effect, i.e., rational choices among 
competing funds, anticipated by regulators because investors did not 
understand relationships between expenses and returns so that they could 
understand the significance of the mandated disclosures. The final 
consideration has been congressional concerns about the growth in mutual 
fund on-going fees which appeared to be rising. This rise was believed due 
to a lack of competition among funds due to investors not being aware of 
the on-going fees of their funds.92 
Investor ignorance has persisted despite several earlier regulatory 
efforts. Beginning in 1988, the SEC requires mutual fund prospectuses to 
include a fee table that shows all fees and charges associated with a mutual 
Fund Investors, Revisited 1 (Inv. Co. Inst., Working Paper, 2004) (setting forth data supporting view 
that 12b-1 fees have reduced for many investors the overall costs of acquiring and holding mutual fund 
shares). 
 88. See Theo Francis, Getting the Most From Fund Costs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2002, at R1 
(exploring the importance of fund fees and related costs to overall expected returns). 
 89. See NASD Rule 2830. 
 90. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-317T, MUTUAL FUNDS: ADDITIONAL 
DISCLOSURES, COULD INCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND OTHER PRACTICES 3 (2004) 
[hereinafter GAO MUTUAL FUNDS]. 
 91. See, e.g., Press Release, The Vanguard Group, Investors Need to Bone Up on Bonds and 
Costs (Sept. 25, 2002) (on file with Vanguard.com) (reporting that seventy-five percent of its survey 
respondents could not define what was meant by “expense ratio” or understand that expenses making 
up that ratio adversely impacted fund returns).  
 92. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-126, MUTUAL FUND FEES: ADDITIONAL 
DISCLOSURE COULD ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION (2000) (responding to request of Congressmen 
Michael G. Oxley and John D. Dingell). 
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fund to be disclosed as a percentage of net assets.93 The SEC has also 
sought to facilitate investors comparing the costs of owning different 
funds. One initiative is its “Mutual Fund Cost Calculator,” an Internet-
based tool that can be found on the SEC’s website.94 The SEC has also 
released several publications (that are also available at the SEC’s website) 
designed to educate investors about the importance of fund expenses.95 We 
are skeptical of the benefits of the “Mutual Fund Cost Calculator” or other 
efforts that require additional steps by investors to transform disclosed 
information before they can act upon it. Our skepticism arises from the 
strong evidence that consumers generally process information in the 
format in which it is made available to them; they do not further transform 
it, as they are expected to do with the “Mutual Fund Cost Calculator.”96  
In 2004, the SEC amended its disclosure requirements for mutual funds 
to require that their semi-annual and annual reports disclose the cost in 
dollars of an investment of $1,000 that earned the fund’s actual return and 
incurred the fund’s actual expenses during that fiscal period.97 The 2004 
amendment also requires disclosure of the costs in dollars based on the 
fund’s actual expenses of a $1,000 investment that earned an assumed 
return of five percent. The expenses used in each of these new disclosures 
are those incurred by the fund in the most recent fiscal half-year (or the 
fund’s second fiscal half-year in the case of the annual report). This 
information is required to be disclosed in tabular format, thereby making it 
more accessible to investors than if set forth textually.98 A narrative 
explanation of the types of costs charged to the fund is also required. 
Before the 2004 amendments, funds disclosed such costs as an operating 
expense ratio. This ratio reported as a percentage of fund assets all the fees 
and other expenses that the fund adviser deducts from the fund’s assets. 
The pre-2004 disclosure requirements, therefore, did not permit the 
 93. See Investment Company Act Rel. No. 16,244 (Feb. 1, 1988) (amending Item 3 of Form N-
1A to require disclosure of the fund’s expense ratio). 
 94. See http://sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mfcc-int.htm. 
 95. See Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ 
inwsmf.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (brochure that describes types of fees and expenses related to 
investing in mutual funds).  
 96. See, e.g., James R. Bettman & Pradeep Kakkar, Effects of Information Presentation Format 
on Consumer Information Acquisition Strategies, 3 J. CONSUMER RES. 233 (1977). 
 97. See Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure Of Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393 (May 10, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Fund 
Expense Adopting Release]. 
 98. Id. at 3–8. Other steps taken in 2004 related to disclosure of fees included modifying the 
format for the expense example showing the effect of an initial investment of $1,000 as of the end of 
the period alongside the expense figures, and showing the fund’s expense ratio expressed as a 
percentage. Id. 
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individual investor to easily approximate the expenses in dollars that were 
incurred by that investor’s account. Overall, the Commission believed the 
approach taken in the 2004 amendments would better help investors 
understand the impact of fund expenses and the relationship between 
expenses and returns.99 
The alternatives considered and rejected by the SEC called for 
disclosure of either the expenses paid by the individual investor or 
expenses associated with a standard investment account.100 For example, 
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) strongly recommended 
that the SEC require disclosure of the specific amount of fees, in dollars, 
for each individual investor’s account.101 The GAO believed that “seeing 
the specific dollar amount paid on shares owned could be the incentive 
that some investors need to take action to compare their fund’s expenses to 
those of other funds and make more informed investment decisions on this 
basis.”102 Additionally, the GAO believed disclosure should not be limited 
to semi-annual and annual reports; relying on a 1997 Investment Company 
Institute survey showing that account statements were the most important 
communication fundholders receive, the GAO recommended that 
disclosure occur in investor account statements.103  
Although disclosure of specific amounts of fees for individual investor 
accounts would unquestionably sharpen the investor’s focus on how fund 
costs impact her account, an investor armed with knowledge of the 
expenses incurred by her account cannot use this information to determine 
whether her expenses would be greater or less if she were the holder in a 
rival fund. As stated by the SEC, “personalized expense disclosure in 
quarterly account statements would not assist investors in making 
comparisons among funds because it would be based on different 
investment amounts and different rates of return.”104 The SEC was also 
concerned about whether such tailored calculations would be unduly 
costly in those instances where various financial intermediaries, for 
example brokers and financial advisers, hold the accounts for their 
customers and would be required in many instances to assemble data 
supplied from many unrelated fund groups before the customer statements 
 99. See id. (“these amendments are intended to provide better information to investors about fund 
costs, investments, and performance.”). 
 100. See id. at 6. 
 101. See GAO, MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 90, at 8. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 5–8. 
 104. See SEC Fund Expense Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 6.  
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could be forwarded.105 The collateral disclosure of the reporting fund’s 
specific expenses against an assumed five percent return is believed by the 
SEC to further facilitate comparisons of current period expenses across 
funds. 
Notably absent from the SEC proposing and adopting releases for 
enhanced disclosure of fund costs is any development of how fund 
investors make comparisons among alternative mutual fund investors. For 
example, the SEC Fund Expense Adopting Release emphasizes that its 
approach better facilitates comparative judgments than does the approach 
urged by the GAO. The SEC’s conclusions on this point are intuitively 
appealing. However, the SEC failed to explore just how investors can, in 
light of the newly disclosed information, proceed to the next step. That 
next step for fund investors and holders is not their consideration whether 
there are better mutual fund investment opportunities, but whether they 
have enough information to even ponder whether their interests are best 
served by doing some comparative shopping. This lacuna in the SEC’s 
regulatory approach is explored in the next section. 
As a preliminary matter in evaluating the steps the SEC has taken and 
those that it is advised to take in the future, it should be noted that the 
Investment Company Act stands in stark contrast to the remaining 
components of the U.S. securities laws. Where the major focus of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act are various mandatory disclosure 
requirements, the regulatory demands of the Investment Company Act 
transcend disclosure by proscribing certain types of transactions and 
undertakings. For example, the Investment Company Act regulates joint 
undertakings between the investment advisor and the fund, requires annual 
approvals of the advisory contract,106 and forecloses complex financial 
structures.107 All such limitations can be overcome either by obtaining an 
SEC exemptive order or by structuring the transaction to fit with the 
tightly drafted conditions set forth in an applicable regulatory exemption. 
More recently, the SEC adopted a series of governance requirements that 
condition many of its safe harbors from otherwise broad prohibitions on, 
among other conditions that the fund must satisfy, the fund having three-
fourths of its directors be independent of the fund’s advisor, its chair being 
 105. Id. at 6–7 (relying on a 2000 industry estimate that this would entail on-going costs of $65 
million whereas the procedures adopted by the SEC would entail estimated costs of $16 million 
annually).  
 106. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (2004) (permitting advisory contracts to have two-year terms 
provided they are renewed annually by a majority of the fund’s outstanding shares). 
 107. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2004) (foreclosing leverage and multiple classes of securities for 
most types of mutual funds). 
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independent of the fund’s advisor, and its independent directors being 
advised by counsel with no historical relationship with the fund’s 
investment advisor.108 These recent initiatives are the most visible 
evidence that under the Investment Company Act, governance and not 
disclosure, is the first line of protecting the fund’s shareholders.  
Before considering how the SEC might improve upon its existing 
disclosure requirements for fund expenses, it is necessary to have some 
insight into how investors engage in meaningful comparisons between 
competing investment choices. The next section provides a behavioral 
background for disclosure recommendations we believe will enhance 
investor welfare. The core of our recommendations is our belief that 
regulation in this area should reflect contemporary insights regarding 
cognitive processes that will be used to evaluate the disclosed 
information.109 
IV. INSIGHTS FROM JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (“JDM”) 
RESEARCH 
For many decades now, one governmental approach to protecting 
consumers has been to provide or mandate the provision of information to 
consumers. There are three potential benefits associated with providing 
consumer information: improved decision-making, enhanced product 
quality, and reduced prices.110 The last benefit, lower prices, often occurs 
when the new information facilitates product comparison, thereby 
encouraging competition. The second benefit, improved quality, occurs 
whenever new information about a product’s attributes causes some 
consumers to alter their choices so as to get more of the featured attribute. 
The SEC’s regulatory action with respect to enhanced disclosure of fees 
and costs can be seen as seeking both price lowering and quality 
improvement benefits. The first benefit, better consumer choice, in some 
 108. See Final Rule: Investment Company Governance, Inv. Co. Rel. No. 26,520 (July 27, 2004) 
(conditioning several safe harbor provisions on compliance with multiple governance requirements to 
strengthen board’s independence). But see Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(remanding rule change to SEC for reconsideration). The SEC, after a more developed record of costs 
of a new rule, re-adopted the earlier provision. See Commission Response to Remand by Court of 
Appeals, Inv. Co. Rel. No. 26,985 (June 30, 2005). 
 109. See generally James R. Bettman, John W. Payne & Richard Staelin, Cognitive 
Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 1 (1986). 
 110. See Michael B. Mazis, Richard Staelin, Howard Beales & Steven Salop, A Framework for 
Evaluating Consumer Information Regulaton, 45 J. MARKETING 11 (1981) (exploring how the 
approach to disclosure can enhance consumer choice while reaching the optimal cost-benefit 
relationship). 
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sense subsumes the last two benefits, and it is almost self-evident since 
consumers armed with more complete information should be able to make 
better decisions than when their choice is based on limited knowledge 
about product attributes. However, none of these benefits will be realized 
unless the consumers understand the information and alter their decision 
patterns. In this section of our paper we draw on judgment and decision 
making (“JDM”) research to address the question of how information 
should be presented to consumers. We will argue that an old and key 
distinction between the availability of information and the processability 
of information111 needs to be taken into account in the design of SEC 
regulatory action. Processability refers to the cognitive ease with which 
information can be comprehended and used. Processability is a function of 
the way the information is presented, the kind of processing to be 
undertaken, and the knowledge base of the consumer. In general, 
information must be both available and easily processable to be used. 
A. The Cornerstone of Bounded Rationality 
The classic study of the distinction between available and processable 
information is that by Professor J. Edward Russo.112 That study concerns 
the use of unit price information by supermarket shoppers spending their 
own money. Russo found that the use of unit price information increased 
(and consumers saved money) when the information was brought together 
for shoppers in the form of organized lists where the available brands were 
ranked by increasing unit price. Russo argued that the standard 
presentations of unit price information, with unit prices posted on the shelf 
under each item, made prices hard to compare and thus were not fully 
used. Note, however, that the standard method of presenting unit price 
information makes the information available.  
The idea that information will have its greatest impact when it is easy 
to process, and not just available, is related to the more basic idea of 
“bounded rationality.” Herbert Simon argued that we need to develop 
models of decision behavior that are compatible with the access to 
information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed 
 111. See J. Edward Russo, Gene Krieser & Sally Miyashita, An Effective Display of Unit Price 
Information, 39 J. MARKETING, Apr. 1975, at 11 (examining possible explanations for why unit 
pricing, regardless of its intuitive appeal, still leads to irrational consumer choices). 
 112. See J. Edward Russo, The Value of Unit Price Information, 14 J. MARKETING RES. 193 
(1977) (study of how consumer choices are affected by unit pricing information, finding benefits to 
consumers when unit prices were reflected on separate shelf tags, but greater benefits when that 
information was presented in a single comparative list).  
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by humans, and not the assumptions found in classical economic theory.113 
Simon further argued that limits on computational capacity are particularly 
important constraints upon the definition of rational choice, i.e., people 
exhibit only “bounded” rationality.114 As a consequence of limited 
cognitive capacity, even well-motivated consumers will often use 
mechanisms (heuristics) involving the selection and use of information to 
solve decision problems. Thus, it will not always be the case that more and 
more information will lead to better and better decisions.  
In addition to the distinction between available and easy-to-process 
information, another implication of the idea of bounded rationality is the 
“concreteness principle” recognized by Professor Paul Slovic.115 Because 
processing of information is costly, people tend to accept information in 
the format in which it is given rather than expending cognitive effort to 
transform it. More generally, it is clear that the particular formats and 
methods for organizing information can greatly influence the ease with 
which various types of decision processing can be carried out.116  
Much of the research on information format effects during the 1970s 
and 80s clearly derived from the bounded rationality concept of Herbert 
Simon. More recently, work on information format has been expanded to 
include research that emphasizes the importance of the rapid, automatic, 
and relatively effortless judgments people reach regarding good-bad 
assessments. Professors Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor117 refer 
to this as the “affect heuristic.” Evidence for the importance of an easy 
good-bad assessment of information values is illustrated below in terms of 
what Professor Christopher Hsee called the “evaluability hypothesis.”118 
 113. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. Econ. 99, 99–100 
(1955) (providing definitions and model of decision-making procedures by individuals that result in 
simplifying heuristics).  
 114. Id. 
 115. See Paul Slovic, Psychology Study Of Human Judgment: Implications For Investment 
Decision Making, 27 J. FIN. 779 (1972) (early study of psychological forces that impede rational 
choice by investors).  
 116. See Bettman et al., supra note 109. 
 117. See Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, Rational Actors or 
Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral Economics, 31 J. SOCIO-ECON. 329 
(2002) (examining factors that affect the heuristics employed in decision-making). 
 118. See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference 
Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES, Sept. 1996, at 247 (reporting that decisions are affected by whether data 
for each item is presented separately or for all options are presented together). 
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B. The Evaluability Hypothesis 
Imagine that you are interested in buying a second-hand music 
dictionary and are given the following information about such a 
dictionary: 
 Number of entries Cosmetic condition 
Dictionary A  20,000 A torn cover 
How much would you be willing to pay (“WTP”) for dictionary A? 
Now imagine that instead of dictionary A you had been asked about 
your willingness-to-pay for the following dictionary: 
 Number of entries Cosmetic condition 
Dictionary B  10,000 Intact cover 
 
How much would you be WTP for dictionary B? 
When asked about dictionaries A and B separately, as above, the WTP 
was higher for dictionary B.119 That is, an intact cover was seemingly 
more important than the number of entries in determining value (WTP). 
However, when dictionaries A and B were presented jointly, and the WTP 
amounts asked for both dictionaries at the same time, the WTP was higher 
for dictionary A. In this case, 20,000 entries was more important than the 
torn cover in determining WTP. Hsee proposed the evaluability hypothesis 
to account for this reversal in value. Specifically, according to the 
evaluability hypothesis, when it is hard to know how good an attribute 
value is, e.g., 20,000 entries, that value will tend to be discounted as 
compared to a more easily evaluated attribute, albeit one that perhaps is a 
less important attribute, such as a torn cover.120 However, when the 
options are presented jointly (an information format effect), it is easier to 
evaluate the number of entries of dictionary A as being good when 
compared to the number of entries of dictionary B. Hsee later showed that 
failure in evaluability can lead people to value an objectively dominated 
option (a seven ounce serving of ice cream overflowing a five ounce cup) 
higher than an objectively dominating option (an eight ounce serving of 
ice cream in a ten ounce cup).121 Apparently it is hard to evaluate seven 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 255–56. 
 121. See Christopher K. Hsee & France Leclerc, Will Products Look More Attractive When 
Presented Separately Or Together?, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 175 (1998) (showing how comparative 
presentation of choices results in different results depending on how the items were perceived as 
attractive or unattractive when first presented separately). 
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ounces or eight ounces of ice cream when considering each option 
independently. In contrast, whether a serving appears overfilled or 
underfilled is relatively easy to evaluate and makes a difference when the 
options are considered separately. However, when presented together, 
people did prefer the option with the eight ounces of ice cream. 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor122 have extended to the idea 
of evaluability the general notion of an affect heuristic mentioned above, 
and the more specific principle that “the weight of a stimulus attribute in 
an evaluative judgment or choice is proportional to the ease or precision 
with which the value of that attribute (or a comparison on that attribute 
across alternatives) can be mapped into an affective impression.”123 This 
principle reflects a general belief of Slovic et al. regarding the importance 
of immediate affective responses in decisions. More generally, Slovic et 
al. have argued that without a context to give affective perspectives to 
quantities, even common or familiar attributes may not be evaluable and, 
thus, will be underweighted in decisions. To illustrate the power of context 
even on the evaluability of dollars, consider the following results:124  
When asked to evaluate a gamble that offered 7/36 chances of winning 
nine dollars, otherwise receiving nothing, on a zero to twenty scale of 
attractiveness (twenty is most attractive), the average response was 9.4. 
Many people thought the 7/36 chance of winning was low—“I’m probably 
not going to win.” However, when asked to evaluate a gamble that offered 
7/36 chances of winning nine dollars, otherwise losing five cents, the 
average rating was 14.9. Apparently, nine dollars carries little weight but 
the more precise and favorable impression of nine dollars as compared to a 
loss of five cents carries more weight, and counterbalances the relatively 
poor probability of winning (7/36) in both cases. If winning nine dollars 
can be hard to evaluate, what difficulties may be experienced in evaluating 
an expense ratio of 0.897% or an expense ratio of 1.297%? 
The importance of a context to give affective perspectives to quantities 
is well appreciated in the domain of consumer information provision for 
goods like household appliances. For example, twenty years ago the 
Federal Trade Commission issued the Appliance Label Rule to help 
consumers decide among appliances. Figure 1 shows an example of the 
now familiar Energy Guide labels showing the highest and lowest energy 
consumption estimates of similar models plus the energy consumption of 
the target brand. The Energy Guide label nicely illustrates a principle for 
 122. See Slovic et al., supra note 117. 
 123. Id. at 334. 
 124. Id. 
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information provision which is to provide information in a relative or 
comparative format whenever possible.  
Unfortunately, even comparative scales are not always sufficient for 
making decisions easier. For instance, knowing that there are options that 
are better on an important attribute does not help the consumer find them. 
As the unit pricing study by Russo125 indicated, a list of products ordered 
by relevant attribute values may be necessary to facilitate comparison 
across products.  
Finally, it is important to recognize that the impact of information 
format on information use is not found just with “unsophisticated” 
decision makers. Professor Arkes, among others, provides many examples 
of biased information processing by even highly sophisticated decision-
makers.126 
To summarize, the research on judgment and decision-making over the 
past several decades makes clear that mandating the disclosure of fees and 
costs of mutual funds is at best only part of the solution. In addition, there 
is a need to worry about how “processable” the mandated information will 
be, given how that information is to be used. Fortunately, there is a wealth 
of research and practice, such as energy guidelines by the FTC, that might 
be used by the SEC to protect investors in making mutual fund decisions.  
V. A PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCED INVESTOR COMPARISONS 
Our thesis is both reasonable and we believe well-supported: the format 
and particularity of the context in which information is presented has a 
significant impact in decision-making by investors.127 Learning that your 
 125. See Russo, supra note 112. 
 126. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing, 
110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486 (1991) (identifying three types of judgment errors—strategy-based errors, 
association-based errors, and psychophysical-based errors—which each can impact the decision-
maker’s judgment). 
 127. See, e.g., John W. Payne, Contingent Decision Behavior, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 382 (1987); 
Richard A. Winett & John H. Kagel, Effects of Information Presentation Format on Resource Use in 
Field Settings, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 655 (1984). See generally JAMES R. BETTMAN, AN 
INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORY OF CONSUMER CHOICE (1979). 
 We do not address here the broader question of whether too much information is disclosed so that 
it exceeds the investors’ processing capacities. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By The Light: 
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) 
(examining the SEC’s extensive disclosure requirements in the context of investors’ bounded 
rationality); Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations 
Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002). Moreover, we do not address the even 
more fundamental question of whether current SEC disclosure requirements are misguided because 
they seek the unrealistic goal of price accuracy. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of 
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995). We instead proceed on the assumption that 
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expense ratio is 1.29% is helpful but more so if this number can easily be 
placed in context.128 What investors wish to know is how this expense 
ratio compares with comparable investment opportunities. Learning that 
you rate a nine on a scale of ten in a competition is much more informative 
than to receive a numerical score when the boundaries of the scale are 
unknown. Thus, much like unit pricing information for grocery products, 
providing operating expense and return disclosures in a truly comparative 
framework is much more likely to elicit an informed choice on the part of 
investors than if operating expenses or return disclosures are made in 
isolation. The material in Part IV supports our conclusion that any 
reporting of expenses should be placed in a context that invites easy 
comparisons by investors. Our proposal is not that there should necessarily 
be more information disclosed to mutual fund investors, but that much 
more attention should be given to the cognitive processes investors can be 
expected to employ in their response to the disclosures that are made.  
We believe that registered funds should be required annually to 
calculate their expense ratio (as well as their net return) relative to other 
funds within their comparable investment classification and to file this 
information with the SEC. Thereafter, the SEC could aggregate the 
information within discrete categories such that each fund thereafter can 
be compared on the basis of its expense ratio and net return with similarly 
classified funds. Thus, SEC disclosure practices would force each fund to 
report the expense ratio range for the comparable group, the expense ratio 
for the reporting fund, and the percentile ranking of the reporting fund’s 
expense ratio. We also believe the most significant moment for disclosure 
is the point of sale,129 although such disclosures are also appropriate and 
certain information is widely recognized as important to investors, such as information regarding a 
fund’s expense ratio and net return, and we focus on how best to make such disclosure processable by 
investors.  
 128. Our suggestion is even stronger yet. We advise that there should be a single disclosure format 
and that the information funds are required to disclose be the same for all funds regardless of their 
type. This suggestion is grounded on research that shows that investors are not assisted by disclosure 
guidelines that permit alternative formats for disclosing the same type of information. See Leslie 
Hodder, Lisa Koonce & Mary Lea McAnally, SEC Market Risk Disclosures: Implications for 
Judgment and Decision Making, 15 ACCT. HORIZONS 49 (2001) (concluding that the SEC’s 1997 
disclosure requirements for derivatives impedes investors’ ability to assess risk because, among other 
examined deficiencies, reporting companies are permitted to employ a variety of reporting formats). 
 129. The SEC currently is proposing enhanced point of sale disclosures. However, its proposals do 
not include any comparative information related to rival funds. Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements 
and Confirmation Requirements for Transactions in Mutual Funds, College Savings Plans, and Certain 
other Securities, and Amendments to the Registration Form for Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release 
No. 8544, SEC Docket 3182 (proposed Feb. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 240, 274). 
See also NASD, MUTUAL FUND POINT OF SALE DISCLOSURE INVESTOR RESEARCH FINDINGS (2005).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/2
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useful for present fund-holders as well. The information could be gathered 
from all registered funds by the SEC based on, for example, results 
through all the reporting funds’ third quarter. This information would then 
be made available to all funds so that they could prepare their annual 
disclosures of their comparative expense ratio at the close of the fourth 
quarter.  
The proposal we offer would include information that is consistent with 
JDM research because it communicates to investors not an isolated 
number, but instead a means by which to place that data point within in a 
comparative group. This greatly simplifies the individual investors’ 
processing of the information. Investors are not required to assemble their 
own comparative information, a process that likely would overwhelm 
them. 
We also believe such comparative information will improve the 
oversight of the fund’s outside directors. Consistent with the wise maxim 
that you manage what is measured, the independent directors are far more 
likely to probe the causes for above-average expense ratios than when not 
aware that the fund’s expense ratio is above average. To be sure, higher 
fees may well reflect more and better services that the advisor provides 
than its competitor with whom it is compared. This fact, of course, is a 
relevant area for close inquiry by the fund’s board.130 Thus, we envision 
that a comparative presentation will greatly facilitate director oversight. 
 130. Equally relevant, but beyond the disclosures we propose here, is the board examining the fees 
advisors charge its institutional clients for whom it provides investment advisory services.  
Recently, Alliance Capital was charging 93 basis points (.93 percent) for managing the $17.5 
billion Alliance Premier Growth Fund. This is a fee paid by shareholders of $162.7 million 
per year. At the same time as it was charging 93 basis points to its own shareholders, Alliance 
was managing the Vanguard U.S. Growth Fund for 11 basis points (.11 percent)—less than 
1/8 of what it was charging Alliance shareholders. Alliance was also managing a $672 million 
portfolio for the Kentucky Retirement System for 24 basis points, a $1.7 billion portfolio for 
the Minnesota State Board of Investment for 20 basis points, a $730 equities portfolio for the 
Missouri Retirement System for 18.5 basis points, and a $975 equity portfolio for the 
Wyoming Retirement System for 10 basis points. 
 These price discrepancies cannot be justified on the basis of differences in service. 
According to the prospectus for the Allliance Stock Fund, the management company’s 
institutional accounts shared “substantially the same investment objectives and policies” and 
were managed with “essentially the same investment strategies and techniques” as the 
Alliance Premier Growth Fund. Moreover, the different clients “shared a nearly identical 
composition of investment holdings and related percentage weightings.” 
Oversight Hearing, supra note 8, at 270–71 (statement of John P. Freeman). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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